International Relations
You must write a medium-length (3-4 page) paper on TWO of the three topics listed below. Each of your two written responses will be worth up to 150 points, for a total of 300 possible points for the exam.
I will have the same two major criteria for evaluating your final exam that I have used throughout the semester. The first is quality and persuasiveness of your arguments. Each topic must have a strong argument expressing your interpretation and reasoning. A casual or superficial response will be insufficient to earn you a strong grade. The second major criterion is your mastery of the material from the course—this is a comprehensive final exam and in it I expect you to demonstrate a thorough understanding of all the material we have covered in the class. You must show an ability to think in abstract terms and to write about terrorism as a general phenomenon as we did throughout the term—here the pivotal readings are Merari, Richardson, Crenshaw/Post, and Moghadam. In addition, you must use historical case studies to provide you with specific examples to support your position on the topics.
In total, your final is to be no more than 8 pages long, with the same general stylistic parameters we have used all quarter—10-12 point font, 1” margins, double-spaced. You must cite specifics from the lectures as well as the course readings in your paper, for which you may use parenthetical references. Please do not use sources not assigned for the class.
ALL finals will be due online Monday, December 7, by 1 pm. Late penalties will apply as before.
I MUST post graduating senior grades on Friday, December 11, so if you are graduating (congratulations!) be certain that you submit your work on time and also indicate on the first page that you are a graduating senior so that I grade your work first.
I will be available for regular online office hours if you would like to talk about the exam.
Final Topic A
A crucial theme that we have noted in our coverage of terrorism, particularly with our coverage of democratic states and terrorism, is the theme of unintended consequences—the way that counter-terrorism can often become counter-productive and result in an escalation of violence instead of eliminating it. This is readily apparent in Black Flags. The US certainly did not want to strengthen terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, but as the book clearly shows, the emergence of an al Qaeda inspired chapter in Iraq and its eventual transformation into ISIS, a powerful terrorist/guerrilla organization with regional aspirations, was a consequence of the US response. Similarly, the FLN in Algeria was a small, unknown actor when the war began in 1954, and owed much of its growth to counter-productive French policies. The UK did not intend to strengthen the Provisional IRA in the 1970s and the Israelis certainly did not intend for their invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 to serve as the catalyst for the formation of Hizballah. Yet in all four cases counterterrorism did prove to be at least partially counter-productive. Why? Why have the counterterrorism policies pursued by democratic states sometimes been extremely counter-productive? For this question you should certainly think about the narrow impact of counterterrorism on terrorist groups, but it is also important that you look at the bigger political question. What kind of impact did counter-terrorism have on the populations in all these areas? Why? How do these bigger political policies affect the growth/decline of terrorist groups? For this topic you must use the relevant lectures, PowerPoints, and readings for all four areas. In addition, you should show a familiarity with terrorism more generally—don’t forget about our readings from early in the class, especially Richardson and Merari on the growth of terrorism. Finally, from our last day lecture, consider Richardson’s rules on combatting terrorism: what rules did these countries follow, which ones did they ignore? Why, do you think?
Final Topic B
One of the themes of this course has been how terrorism ends. Earlier in the term we saw several cases of success—the Provisional IRA succeeded in bringing about a negotiated process in which its main goals were considered, even if the result fell short of what the IRA wanted. The FLN in Algeria and Irgun and Lehi in Mandate Palestine succeeded completely in their goals of establishing states. For this topic, I would like you to compare these cases of success with cases of failure—the destruction of the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the implosion of the Weather Underground and RAF. Why did the IRA, the FLN, Irgun, and Lehi achieve some degree of success while the LTTE, the Red Army Faction, and the Weather Underground failed? To develop this argument, you will need to review the specific material for all of the groups included above. Also, you will need to review the material from early in the semester on terrorism as a general phenomenon so that you can make a meaningful comparison. In particular, evaluate the above groups in terms of primary motivations—which groups had clear and achievable political goals and managed not to be sidetracked by secondary motivations? Also, think of terrorism as political violence, as violence that is used to represent and promote the agendas of a particular community. Which of these groups managed to make a strong claim toward representing their communities and why?
Final Topic C
After the September 11 attacks, it was very common for analysts, politicians, and other public figures to speak of a “new terrorism,” as represented by Al Qaeda’s global jihadism. Al Qaeda’s terrorism was truly international rather than having a specific local focus such as nationalist terrorism. At the same time there were significant similarities between al Qaeda and local jihadi groups like Hamas and Hizballah. All three groups have religion as a primary motivation and all three have made extensive use of suicide bombing as a brutal and intimidating weapon. More recently al Qaeda’s Iraqi chapter evolved into ISIS and diverged from al Qaeda, and seemed to have qualities of all the aforementioned groups: it had international ambitions—establishing a caliphate—like al Qaeda, but has also set about conquering, holding, and administering territory, like Hamas and Hizballah. Your task for this topic is to compare these organizations to answer the following: Was ISIS as it emerged and evolved from 2003-2014 more like al Qaeda, or was it more like local jihadi organizations like Hizballah and Hamas? To compare the groups, you need to consider the overall ideologies/goals of the groups, their relationships with the groups of people that they claim to represent, and their capabilities, military, political, social, and so on. For this section, be sure to cover the relevant lecture/PowerPoint material on all four groups. In terms of reading, you must use Warrick, Black Flags for AQ in Iraq/ISIS, and the reserves for Al Qaeda by Lawrence Wright and Thomas Hegghammer, Krista Wiegand’s article and Byman’s chapter on Hizballah, and Robin Wright and Jessica Stern’s coverage of Hamas. (Note—Stern’s coverage of al Qaeda in Terror in the Name of God is very dated and inaccurate; please don’t use it for the paper!) However you approach this topic, on the whole you will probably find some similarities and differences among the groups, and your argument should reflect this; at the same time I will expect you to weigh the similarities and differences in order to answer the basic question
I PICK TOPICS B AND C
ANSWER
How Terrorism Ends
Often terrorism agendas succeed while in other instances it fails. Successful terrorism groups have been such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria and the Irgun and Lehi in Palestine. On the other hand, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany and the Weather Underground Organisation (WUO) in America are examples of a militant terror group that failed in their agendas. Using the individual primary group motivations this essay develops an argument as to why while the IRA, the FLN, Irgun, and Lehi achieved some degree of success; the LTTE, the Red Army Faction, and the Weather Underground failed.
The success of the IRA, FLN and the Irgun and Lehi can be attributed to the changing nature of the world during the period of their operation. The four groups all sought out to bring to an end of foreign governments in their countries. Similarly, during the same period, the United Nations was founded that supported the sovereignty of nations and civility in governance. The Provisional Irish Republican Army proved to the twentieth century most inventive and adaptive of all the violent non-state terror groups in the world. Their ability to conform to the changing nature of their agenda can perhaps be attributed to their success in guerrilla (Marighella 1971). The paramilitary organisation primary motivation was to end British rule in Northern Ireland and the reunification of Ireland. According to researchers, the IRA most innovative exploits was the employment of guerrilla tactics that included sabotage, ambush and raids pushing the British government closer and closer to submission and negotiation. The resulting outcome of the fight against the British was the development of two political units, the Irish Free State that had twenty-six counties with dominion status in the British Empire and Northern Ireland with six counties and still part of the United Kingdom. This outcome was less than what the IRA had set out to do, but their main agenda had been addressed; Ireland had pushed Britain to a negotiation table to discuss the future of its own governance free from the British. What followed beyond that was splitting of the IRA with some against the outcome and other against, but to this point, the organisation could be said to have succeeded in their primary objective.
The primary motivation of the Front de Liberation Nationale was to end colonial rule of the French in Algeria. The method of operation of the FLN was guerrilla warfare while at the same time diplomacy with the United Nations looking to create a sovereign Algerian state (Pierre 2015). However, between the two, the French government and the FLN was a third party which was the French Algerians that were opposed to the agendas of the FLN. The fight for Algeria was brutal with the French Algerians being merciless and violent beyond measure and acting independently of the French government. However, when warfare was opposed and resources cut, the FLN looked towards the United Nations which by 1959 had begun being opposed to colonisation which intermittently leads to Algeria’s independence in 1962 (Pierre 2015). The FLN had fully achieved its agenda through strife, violence and death. Again as in both Algeria and Ireland, the Irgun and Lehi sought to end British rule in Mandatory Palestine. They made guerrilla warfare on British police and governments. The fight led to the end of the British Mandate for Palestine by a declaration of Independence in 1948.
The unsuccessful terror groups did not have independence from a foreign government as a primary objective. For instance, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam sought to fight for the rights of Tamil where they intended to form a state from Sri Lanka which would be called Tamil. Tamil would be a breakaway independent and socialist state. After twenty-six years of warfare, the military of Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE in 2009, and their primary objective was still unachieved. The Red Amy Faction as another example sought out to trigger aggressive responses from the government, which the RAF believed would prompt a bigger revolutionary movement. The RAF did not have the support of the public and in that was limited in recruits. Similarly, German police were swift in thwarting off the first generation RAF supporters that it came to a gradual conclusion. Lastly, the Weather Underground Organisation had the motivation to build a revolutionary party that would bring to an end American Imperialism. The organisation went into a fast decline due to lacking in its tactical ability and the reactionary response of the American anti-terrorist departments.
From these observations, it is clear that the success of a terrorist group is largely dependent on the support it gains within the country and outside the country. With the three success groups mentioned, the United Nations appears severally supporting diplomacy, negotiations and sovereignty (Guevara 2002). In the instances where terror groups failed, their agendas were either too shallow, their tactics limited and their support both inside their country of operation and outside lacking. The argument as to why some terrorist organisations succeed while others fail, therefore, becomes a conclusive, and decisive conclusion that terror groups like any other organisation require planning, funding and support (Moghaddam 2005).
New Terrorism
There are significant similarities between al Qaeda and local jihadi groups like Hamas and Hizballah like the fact that they are all base religion as their primary motivation and apply similar tactics such as suicide bombing. Al Qaeda has recently evolved to ISIS, which bears the characteristics of the aforementioned groups. Like Hamas and Hizballah, ISIS seeks to conquer, hold and manage territory and like al Qaeda, ISIS has international ambitions. This essay discusses the similarities and differences between ISIS and al Qaeda, Hamas and Hizballah to establish which overall ideologies ISIS represent alongside their terror capabilities, politics and activities.
Despite similar origins, al Qaeda and ISIS have adapted more distinct paths and goals. Majorly, the difference is in the foundation that while al Qaeda appeared to use terror as an instrument for prompting audience in specific issues and expecting their impact to change things as they are into a situation that could favour them, ISIS is more complex with a fundamental task to develop a political order within the regions of its operation. ISIS has risen in popularity as al Qaeda has diminished since the death of its leader, Osama bin Laden. United States intelligence provides that before Osama’s death, the al Qaeda franchise in Iraq was led by a man called Ayman al-Zawahiri, who recently has admonished the ISIS claiming that it is “extremist and excessive”. With this behaviour alone, differences can be drawn from the two organisation, one being the fact that they are in competition with each other for global popularity. Another key difference is in leadership. Under Osama bin Laden, all these organisations rallied behind his elitist view that was designed to destabilise the Western governments (Wright 2002). Without Osama, each was left to his own agenda, principle and opinion that has made the terror groups, though similar, very different in perspective.
With Hamas, ISIS has an even more complicated relationship. Hamas is in part a Muslim Brotherhood where it comprises a national movement with “an Islamist bent, intent on wiping out the Jewish state and forming an Islamic state in the area that is now Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (Charter 1988). ISIS, on the other hand, refers to an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which is a Salafist franchise of Islam with a desire to impose Sharia law by recreating the Islamic caliphate. With this, ISIS sees Hamas as apostates, people who have to renounce true Islam and there differ in principle. Conflict can be observed on isolated incidences; for instance, Hamas supported the Palestinian democracy and election in Gaza and West Bank and similarly took a step towards an improved relationship with Egypt (Charter 1988). This is in contrast to ISIS support for Sharia law and ISIS war with Egypt since 2013. There have been later proof that ISIS was at war with Hamas based on their differences in principle, action, opinion, motivation and strategy. Conclusively, ISIS has very prominent differences in comparison to similarities with Hamas.
Hezbollah, on the other hand, has its foundation in Lebanon and dates back to the 1980s. Iran helped its foundation as a means to extend its influence in the region (Wiegand 2009). Under the influence of Iran, the organisation has engaged in conflict with ISIS, which Hezbollah feels is a growing threat to the region and especially to the existence of Lebanon. Against each other, the two have fought for the Syrian-Lebanese border with Hezbollah looking to promote the interests of Lebanon and ISIS looking to have the Middle East under one general cover governed by Sharia law. Apart from their commitment to territory and to their ideals, Hezbollah shares no similarities with ISIS. There is also a distant possibility that Hezbollah is not entirely a terrorist group give that it has full and lawful control over the Lebanese military (Wiegand 2009). To many ISIS supporters, Hezbollah is Iran puppet doing its bidding without the interests of its people at the core. However, the two are at war with each other.
As can be observed, ISIS, in fact, has more similarities to al Qaeda than to Hezbollah or to Hamas. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria defines its ideology as a mid-way between extremists and non-extremists. It disapproved democracy, international interference from the West, Israel and Jerusalem as the capital and people who do not abide by Sharia law. It promotes religious violence and regards any other religion, including Islam that is not strict on Sharia as infidels or apostates, which is a name it has called Hamas. With Sharia law, the organisation hopes to one day integrate the Middle East into one form of government support by traditional Islamic laws of Sharia.
References
Charter, H. (1988). The charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic resistance movement.
Guevara, C. (2002). Guerrilla warfare. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Marighella, C. (1971). Minimanual of the urban guerrilla.
Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism: A psychological exploration. American psychologist, 60(2), 161.
Pierre, M. H. (2015). Gathering Of Human Intelligence In Counter-Insurgency Warfare:: The French Experience During The Battle Of Algiers (January-October 1957). Pickle Partners Publishing.
Wiegand, K. E. (2009). Reformation of a terrorist group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese political party. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(8), 669-680.
Wright, L. (2002). The man behind bin Laden. The New Yorker, 16, 56-85.
